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Abstract
As a prominent representative and aggregator of Neo-
Pragmatists, Richard Rorty carries on Pragmatists’ rejection 
of the pursuit of certainty, objectivity, rationality and truth 
by traditional western philosophers since Plato. This paper 
traces Rorty’s Neo-Pragmatic view of science to his anti-
essentialism and anti-foundationalism. Then, it points out 
that Rorty constructs his philosophical view of science 
as a single type of culture by denying the equivalence 
between science and truth. Rorty’s view of natural science 
has its ethical implication in that he sees both scientific 
and moral progress not as a matter of getting closer to the 
True or the Objective or the Good or the Right, but as an 
increase in people’s sympathy, sensitivity, and imaginative 
power, which enhances human sense of happiness, a chief 
concern of pragmatic philosophers. In the concluding 
part, the authors argue that through reducing objectivity to 
solidarity, Rorty takes both science and ethics as the source 
of suggestions about what to do with our lives. He initiates 
a new pragmatic perspective of ethics, sketching a moral 
blueprint of future human society
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INTRODUCTION
Pragmatism developed in local America has been different 
from traditional philosophy since it gave up the pursuit of 
certainty, objectivity, rationality and truth. Pragmatists take 
morality and ethics as the beginning of their philosophical 
thinking, giving human well-being the first priority in 
philosophical consideration. Interacted with Analytic 
Philosophy, Pragmatism revived since the late 1970s. 
The glamorous and influential representative of Neo-
pragmatism, Richard Rorty carries on the moral concerns 
from his hero John Dewey, taking the ethical practical issue 
of “How to live a happy life” in the present post-industrial 
society when science and technology is highly developed as 
the central consideration of philosophical thinking. Rorty’s 
philosophical framework is ontologically anti-essentialism, 
and against foundationalism in terms of epistemology. On 
the basis of this framework of philosophy, which is quite 
untraditional and anti-metaphysical, Rorty develops his 
viewpoint on science1. According to Rorty, science is rather 
“a” culture, equal to and no better than any other culture 
such as literature, music etc., than “the” culture which, as 
commonly believed in the intellectual history, closer to 
truth because of its objectivity and rationality. Through 
dissolving the differentiation between science and non-
science, Rorty means to reset the aim as seeking solidarity 
of human beings among cultural communities, instead of 
the “hard facts” or reality. Rorty’s attitude towards science 
implies a profound ethical meaning, which embodies his 
Neo-pragmatic moral aim – solidarity. 
1 .   T H E  N E O - P R A G M A T I C 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1  Against Essentialism 
From the earliest time in Western philosophical history, 
1 Science in this paper refers specifically to natural science.
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the unchanging and eternal essence has been a major 
philosophical issue. It is believed that under the cover 
of a variety of appearances, everything has its inhuman 
intrinsic essence. To find or get closer to this kind of 
inborn nature of the world, human beings, knowledge, or 
anything else has been the ultimate goal of philosophical 
thinking and practice. 
Rorty is, with his analytical hero Wittgenstein 
and pragmatic hero Dewey, strongly opposite to any 
form of essentialism. In his articles “A world without 
substances or essences” and “Anti-essentialism and 
leftist literature”, Rorty specifically clarified his anti-
essentialist attitude in philosophy. For pragmatists like 
him, there is no such thing as a “non-relational feature of 
X”, or “the intrinsic nature, the essence, of  X” (Rorty, 
1999, p.50), so the habit of distinguishing inner and 
outer, the core and the edge of X must be abandoned. 
The attempt to get rid of this differentiation is what 
Rorty names anti-essentialism.
As Rorty attributes the essence of philosophical 
questions to linguistic description, he denies the 
possibility of picking out an object from the rest of the 
universe. What we can say about an object is that some 
sentences of it are true. Of the various descriptions about 
an object, some of them are surely better than the others, 
but none of them is of the identity of its own essence. No 
description of an object is more objective, more accurate, 
or even closer to the innate nature of it. No description 
could help us out of language and into facts, or out of 
appearance and into reality (Rorty, 1999, p.56). This way, 
truth is no longer the correspondence between appearance 
and reality, but something better or something more 
useful. 
Basically, for anti-essentialists like Rorty, “the Platonic 
quest, the attempt to get behind appearance to the intrinsic 
nature of reality, is hopeless” (Rorty, 1999, p.48). The 
pursuit of essentialism is an impasse, so philosophy is 
simply what Hegel says, to grasp the thoughts of one’s 
era. 
1.2  Against Foundationalism 
Ever since the year 1979, in which his Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature was published, Rorty has made 
it clear to the entire academic circle about his anti-
foundational philosophical stance. Rorty declares to break 
with the traditional philosophical pursuit of the“First 
Principle”handed down from ancient Greek, encouraging 
the resist to the attraction of seeking the natural 
hierarchical order in human activities. 
Western  phi losophers  af ter  P la to  have  been 
persevering with a solid base for the mansion of human 
knowledge, convinced that “there is or must be some 
permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which 
we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature 
of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or 
rightness” (Bernstein, 1983, p.8). The matrix serves as a 
scale or standard, or reference based on which knowledge 
is evaluated during the philosophical process. 
Rorty’s attitude towards the attempt to establish the 
framework for the human knowledge system is a complete 
rejection. As a radical anti-foundationalism, he suggests 
resisting the comfort or solace of determinacy brought 
by the objective foundation of knowledge by criticizing 
the fantasy of pursuing objective knowledge. He even 
advocates substituting the foundational epistemology 
for hermeneutics. Hermeneutics values more about the 
conversation between people, within or cross disciplines, 
by contrast to the traditional epistemological inquiry of 
generality and certainty. 
In general, Rorty’s philosophical stance is anti-
traditional. He abandons the inquiry for essence and the 
foundation of knowledge since Plato, only to view western 
philosophy from an uncertain, ahistorical perspective 
rather than an objective, universal perspective. On this 
philosophical ground, Rorty develops his neo-pragmatic 
view of natural science. Natural science for him, does not 
seek rationality, objectivity or truth, rather, as a culture of 
many, it aims at the solidarity of communities and happy 
life of people. 
2.  THE NEO-PRAGMATIC VIEW OF 
SCIENCE 
2.1  Science Does Not Equal to TRUTH
Essentialists and foundationalists have always been 
inquiring the objective and real TRUTH. In the medieval 
theological period, truth is God, whereas since the rational 
enlightenment, science gradually becomes the synonym 
of truth. The worship of science as truth reaches its peak 
fueled by logical positivism between the 1930s and the 
1950s. Natural science is identified as the exemplar of 
objectivity and rationality, since it provides truth that 
is correspondent to reality. Even the successfulness of 
litterateurs, philosophers, and historians in the area of 
humanity and social society, have to be judged by the 
standard of science. As a postmodernist in the humanist 
camp, Rorty is strongly against scientism like this. 
To Rorty’s knowledge, science, the “paradigmatic 
human activity”, was mistakenly beheld as superior to 
the other subjects for two of its distinctive features: One 
is the scientific method adopted during the scientific 
process; the other is its extraordinary relations with reality 
(1991, p.46). Rorty is not the first one to challenge the 
superiority of scientific method. As early as in the 1970s, 
anarchist Feyerabend propagandized his opposition to 
the methodology of natural science as the only rational, 
objective, and adoptable one to all the other subjects by 
putting forward his principle of “anything goes” (1993, 
p.19). Different from Feyerabend’s radicalism in terms of 
scientific method, Rorty is nonetheless radical in his own 
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way. He accounts the success of natural science to the uses 
of helpful terminology, not the scientific methods, “the 
same banal and obvious methods all of us use in every 
human activity”. Take Galileo’s free fall experiment as an 
example, Rorty interprets Galileo’s success and Aristotle’s 
failure as that Galileo was using some terminology to help 
prove his good idea whilst Aristotle was not, so Aristotle 
had a less good idea. In this battle of science in history, 
Galileo, as Rorty sees it, “just lucked out” (1994). In this 
way, Rorty deconstructs the myth of science as supreme in 
its methodology, thus destabilizes the idea that scientific 
method may lead to an absolute conception of reality. 
Scientific realism, as is defined by van Fraassen, refers to 
“the view that the picture science gives us of the world is 
true, and that the entities postulated really exist” (1984). 
Rorty disproves the special relations between science and 
reality through his discussion about the existence of the 
best scientific explanation. He believes that, “postulating 
things you can’t see to explain things you can see seems 
no more specific to those activities normally called 
‘science’ than in modus ponens.” (Rorty, 1991, p.53) No 
one, not even scientists, could build reliable connection 
between theoretical entities such as electrons or genes and 
the successful application of scientific theories or methods. 
Therefore, Rorty would rather dissolve than resolve the 
issue of realism versus anti-realism. So far, Rorty denies 
thoroughly the differentiation between natural science and 
other human activities, hence demolishes the identification 
of science as truth.
2.2  Science Is “a” Aulture 
When science is no longer viewed as the equivalence of 
truth, objectivity, rationality, it descends from the King 
of Culture’s throne to a single type of culture, which is 
no better than any of the others. Science as “a” culture, 
instead of “the” culture, has its merits, which according 
to Rorty, can be summarized as the following three 
points—the first is that science is helpful in foreseeing 
and controlling human activities; the second, scientists 
make contributes to human solidarity with their moral 
virtue; the third is that science of different types create 
new vocabulary based on which human beings recreate 
themselves. These three traits are praised for natural 
science, but not uniquely the advantages of it. Other 
cultures such as art, literature, politics etc. may possess 
some or all of these advantages as well. 
By deconstruction the objectivity, truthfulness of 
natural science, Rorty attempts to “level down the natural 
sciences to an epistemological par with art, religion, and 
politics”, but not, as American pragmatism has always 
been hesitating about, “to raise the rest of culture to the 
epistemological level of natural sciences” (1991, p.63). 
He intends to construct a post-scientific world of multiple 
cultures, in which all the other cultures have equal 
discourse power as natural science does. Post-science 
culture exactly reflects Rorty’s historical and relativist 
pursuit against the pursuit of absoluteness and certainty 
of universalism, and his endorsement to replace mono-
culture with diverse culture. What Rorty values are the 
confluence of scientific culture and human culture, which 
makes a constant approach to the ultimate goal of human 
solidarity and happiness?
In general, in Rorty’s view, natural science doesn’t 
have the supreme epistemic status. Established on the 
same solidary philosophical foundation, Rorty’s view of 
science and view of ethics are similar and comparable to 
each other. For instance, like Kuhn and Dewey, he sees 
scientific inquiry as working in much the same way as 
moral inquiry does. Rorty admits that it is more difficult to 
convince people of our moral view than of our scientific 
views (2007). That is probably because natural science 
provides “hard facts”, whereas morals are relatively 
more subjective. However, he “level(s) down” science  
(Posner, 1999, p.18), so that science will no longer power 
over ethics. For Rorty, contrary to the traditional belief 
that natural science aims at seeking truth, objectivity, 
correspondence or certainty, while ethics, goodness or 
general moral principle, science and ethics are both human 
discourses in which solidarity of the largest number of 
people could be reached. Science and ethics aim at the 
increase of people’s imaginative power and solidarity, 
which as Rorty strongly believes, may hence promote 
human sense of wellbeing. 
3.  ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE 
VIEW OF SCIENCE
3.1  Morality Is Not Rationality—Cases of 
Scientists and Moral Philosophers as Better 
Moral Exemplars
Rorty agrees that scientists are better moral exemplars, 
and moral philosophers can make better moral decisions. 
However, he never accounts for the morality of scientists 
or moral philosophers to be more rational. As Rorty 
sees it, to be moral has nothing to do with the pursuit of 
rationality. 
Scientists have frequently been conspicuous exemplars 
of certain moral virtues. Rorty believes the worship of 
scientists as models of morality and reason may date back 
to the 19thC, when the rhetoric of scientism confused the 
moral virtues with the intellectual virtue of rationality. In 
this kind of account, rationality refers to “the crucial link 
between humanity and the nonhuman”, or “our access to 
an ‘absolute conception of reality’, the means by which 
the world ‘guides’ us to a correct description of itself” 
(Rorty, 1991, p.61).
Rorty doesn’t approve this kind of rationality; 
instead, he differentiates the two meanings of rationality. 
Traditionally, to be rational is to be methodical, that is, “to 
have criteria for success laid down in advance” (Rorty, 
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1991, p.36). Based this definition, law, business, and 
science are good examples of rationality, but humanities 
are never, because judges, businessmen and scientist know 
in advance the criteria for the success of their activities 
while poets and painters are not sure of what kind of 
an aim they want to reach before they have finished the 
work. Therefore, Rorty sticks to the second meaning of 
rationality: sane or reasonable. In this sense, rationality 
means a set of moral virtues: “Tolerance, respect for 
the opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, 
reliance on persuasion rather than force” (Rorty, 1991, 
p.37), with which a civilized society could develop. 
For pragmatists, it’s simply a historical accident that 
people good at providing technology also serve as good 
examples of certain moral virtues, as is the fact that, in 
contemporary Russia and Poland, literary figures are 
the best examples of certain other moral value (Rorty, 
1991, p.62). Scientists, with their virtue “of relying on 
persuasion rather than force, of respect for the opinions 
of colleagues”, of relatively incorruptibility, of patience 
and reason, “of curiosity and eagerness for new data and 
ideas” (Rorty, 1991, p.39), set good examples for human 
activity and contribute to the solidarity of human beings.
Scientists are moral exemplars. Then, how about the 
moral philosophers? Are they more experienced or correct 
in making difficult moral choices? Australian ethicist Peter 
Singer once expressed his belief that, moral philosophers 
are capable of providing soundly based moral theories, 
with which they are able to correct society’s moral 
intuitions. For him, “the philosopher’s training makes him 
more than ordinarily competent in assessing arguments 
and detecting fallacies, and he “has studied the nature of 
moral concepts, and the logic of moral argument.” (Singer, 
1974) According to Singer, moral philosophers have a 
different but better source of moral knowledge than the 
public’s intuitions can provide. 
On Rorty’s account, this source is what philosophers 
traditionally refer to as “reason”, which is generally taken 
for granted to have an authority that takes precedence 
over any alternative source. Rorty refutes the three ideas 
inferred from Singer’s viewpoint – First, the “notion 
of a moral theory based on something sounder than a 
set of moral intuitions”; Second, moral concepts have a 
special nature that the experts understand better than the 
vulgar; and Third, moral argument has a special logic 
that philosophical training enables one to appreciate. As 
Rorty puts it, to grasp the concept of morality is simply 
to know how to use the word. It’s hardly imaginable 
for a moral philosopher to be able to use concepts like 
“right”, “ought”, and “responsible” better than the laity 
does, through any special training. What’s more, it’s 
confusing that according to Singer’s standpoint, judges 
and social workers will be less familiar with the logic of 
moral argument than trained moral philosophers. Rorty’s 
understanding is that, moral philosophers are usually 
widely read and imaginative. Widely read people often 
do better in making moral choices than people with little 
leaning and therefore little imagination (Rorty, 2007, 
pp.185-186). 
It is obvious to see from Rorty’s argument that he 
agrees with Singer in that moral philosophers may make 
better moral choices than the ordinary people do, but 
the accounts diverge. Singer takes Kant more seriously, 
so in terms of making the right moral choices, he would 
like to resort to the separate source for moral principles, 
the essence, and reason. As an anti-Kantianist, Rorty 
doesn’t believe that moral principles have inherent nature, 
nor does he believe that the grand general principles 
of morality are more reliable than intuition. For him, 
specialists in moral philosophy do not “have better 
arguments or clearer thoughts than most”, but simply 
“have spent much time talking over some of the issues 
that trouble people faced with hard decisions about what 
to do”. They are “more imaginative”, not “more rational” 
(Rorty, 2007,  pp.201-202).
3.2  Moral Progress Is the Increase of Sympathy, 
Sensitivity and Imaginative Power
Pragmatists like Rorty do not think of scientific inquiry, 
or any other inquiry, as aiming at truth, but at better 
justification ability. It is to better deal with doubts about 
what we are saying by supporting our previous viewpoints 
or making some new or different statements. Therefore, 
“scientific progress is a matter of integrating more and 
more data into a coherent web of belief” (Rorty, 1999, 
p.82), but not penetrating appearance until we reach 
reality. The data may be gained from our eyes, or come 
from microscopes or telescopes, or experiments, or even 
the existing facts. 
Pragmatists do not take scientific progress as seeing 
the intrinsic nature of reality through the appearance, but 
as increasing the “ability to respond to the concerns of 
ever larger groups of people” (Rorty, 1999, p.81), who do 
scientific researches. Likewise, they see moral progress as 
being able to respond to the needs of an ever larger group 
of people. 
In this way, Rorty disagrees with Kant in the 
following two standpoints concerning moral progress. 
The first is that moral progress is a matter of an increase 
in rational ability. Pragmatists like Rorty would have 
never encouraged the supremacy of rationality in any 
culture; instead, they hold that moral progress is a matter 
of making our sympathy wider and wider, but not a 
matter of rising above the sentimental and intuitive to the 
rational. Morality is something about action, not theories, 
so it is the best to consider moral progress as a matter 
of promoting our sensitivity to pain, consciousness, and 
responsiveness in real practice to the needs of a larger and 
larger variety of people and things. If we change our focus 
from rationality, or truth, or anything of determinacy, to 
our ability to “make the little things that divide us seem 
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unimportant”, to become more and more sympathetic to 
larger groups of us, moral progress might be accelerated. 
The brilliance of moral virtues is exactly shown in these 
trivial matters. To some extent, taking Rorty’s stance of 
moral progress might help to improve the medical ethics 
status in China. If the doctors could progress in morality 
by developing more sympathy and sensitivity to the 
physical illness, mental helplessness or even economic 
burden suffered by their patients, rather than becoming 
increasingly apathetic and indifferent to them because they 
are so accustomed to death and the imbalance of resource 
division, there may not be frequent medical disputes.  
The second view of Kant rejected by Rorty is that 
moral progress is constantly getting a clear vision of 
our unconditional moral obligations. Kant helps us to 
get rid of the doctrine that morality is a matter of divine 
command, but unfortunately he maintains the concept 
of unconditional moral obligations, which Pragmatists 
would like to abandon. Just like their notion of science 
continually approximating to the inhuman “God’s 
eye view”, foundationalists think that human social 
custom continually approaches to “the moral law” in 
periods of moral progress. In contrast to the Kantianists’ 
presupposition of “the existence of something non-
relational, something exempt from the vicissitudes of time 
and history, something unaffected by changing human 
interests and needs” (Rorty, 1999, p.82), Pragmatists hold 
a historical view of both science and moral progress. They 
discard the belief that in order to make moral progress, 
we need to gradually decrease the influence of prejudice 
and superstition, allowing us to clarify our unconditional 
moral obligations, just like their abandon of “discovering 
the intrinsic nature of physical reality”. In terms of 
morality, Pragmatists tend to replace Kantian idea of a 
Good Will, which seems relatively more essential and 
abstract, with the idea of maximally warm, sensitive and 
sympathetic human being, which seems more practical 
and easier to do.
For Rorty, the engine of moral progress is the ability 
to come up with new ideas with imagination, rather than 
the ability to get closer to unchanging essences (2006). 
To make it more specifically, imagination is taken as the 
cutting edge of cultural evolution, the power of which 
makes human future better off than the past. “Imagination 
is the source both of new scientific pictures of the 
physical universe and of new conceptions of possible 
communities.” (Rorty, 1999, p.87) In this respect, moral 
progress is the increase of imagination, with which we 
could create infinite possibilities of solidarity. 
3.3  Morality as Solidarity   
If it is on the level of individual morality that Rorty 
judges moral progress with the growth of sympathy and 
imaginative power, on the level of public morality, Rorty 
advocates seeking solidarity among the widest variety of 
human communities. 
Over two hundred years ago, when Immanuel Kant 
asks the traditional philosophical question “What is 
Man”, he means to ask about something like “how does 
the human species differ from the other animals”. As 
Rorty rejects the pursuit of TRUTH in science, he objects 
to the pursuit of GOODNESS for ethics. Therefore, by 
contrast to this science, ontological and metaphysical 
Kantian question, Rorty asks the political or ethical 
question of “Who are we”. This question doesn’t inquire 
moral universalism or objectivity; rather it encourages the 
expansion of human communities of morality, as well as 
the increase of solidarity between “we” and “all the other 
people”. 
In terms of morality, Rorty’s solidarity refers to the 
ability to see more and more traditional differences (of 
tribe, religion, races, customs, and the like) as unimportant 
when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation—the ability to think of people wildly different from 
ourselves as included in the range of “us” (1989, p.192).
Rorty’s  sol idari ty can be explained with his 
comparison of making moral progress as sewing a huge, 
elaborate and multi-colored quilt, but not making clear of 
something true and deep. Rorty would like rather replace 
traditional metaphors of depth or height with metaphors 
of breadth and extent than probing into the issue of 
depth and height such as human essence, the universal 
etc. Pragmatists like Rorty wish to have the differences 
minimized, but not to overwhelm the differences with the 
strong. According to his metaphor of quit, to solidarism 
is to minimize “the difference between Christian and 
Muslims in a particular village in Bosnia”, “the difference 
between blacks and whites in a particular town in 
Alabama” , “the difference between gays and straights in 
a particular Catholic congregation in Quebec”. The hope 
is to sew such different parties together with thousands of 
little stitches—to invoke thousands of little commonalities 
between members of the groups. Rorty has set an idealistic 
aim for solidary morality, i.e. “we have a moral obligation 
to feel a sense of solidarity with all other human beings” 
(1989, p.190). 
In general, Rorty sees neither intellectual nor moral 
progress as a matter of getting in touch with something 
true, or good, or right. Moral progress is not about 
rationality, but an increase in one’s sympathy, sensitivity 
to each other, and the greater role played by imaginative 
power. To be moral is to improve solidarity among an ever 
enlarging community of people, so there is no settled final 
vocabulary in Rorty’s moral vision. 
CONCLUSION
Based on thinking about, questioning and criticizing 
traditional philosophy, Rorty integrate science and ethics, 
both serve as the “source of suggestions about what to do 
with our lives” (Leiter, 2007). By viewing science and 
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morality as pursuing solidarity of human community 
through communication, rather than as the representative 
of objectivity or reality, Rorty advocates that we expand 
our sense of “us” to more and more people whom we 
instinctively classify as “they”, or even marginalized 
people, and that we respect the variety of culture related 
to our social practice, so as to expand our moral vision 
and achieve solidarity in the largest group of people. 
Therefore, Rorty obviously takes ethics, as well as 
human welfare, as the starting point of his philosophical 
thinking.
Rorty’s view of ethics, as he himself puts it, is ethics 
without principles. Just like his view of natural science, 
Rorty’s ethics is bound to be challenged as relativism. 
What’s more, his solidary morality is very grand and 
oversimplified. Its overemphasis on the factor of human 
emotion, especially the sympathy of the elites and the 
powerful to their inferior, neglects the proof of practice or 
feasibility. However, Rorty’s alternative ethical thoughts 
initiate a new pragmatic perspective, sketching a moral 
blueprint of future human society. 
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